Poland Targeted by Disinformation

Poland’s Digital Battlefield: How Russian Propaganda Channels Exploit Telegram to Weaken Ukrainian Support

An elaborate web of pro-Russian propaganda operations on Telegram systematically directs its efforts at the people of Poland. The goal of these operations is to weaken the nation's consistent backing of Ukraine. A collection of over twenty-two Polish-language channels, which collectively have an audience larger than 150,000, are engaged in spreading false information. They often use doctored materials and untrue stories to diminish trust and create division. This online assault is a key battleground in the wider information conflict that goes along with Russia’s military actions. The situation underscores how susceptible social media can be to foreign campaigns intended to disrupt European solidarity.

The campaign uses methods that are both blatant and nuanced. Fabricated videos show actors speaking Ukrainian poorly while dressed in generic uniforms that are simple to buy, creating scenes of fake brutality. This material then gets magnified throughout a web of linked channels. These outlets frequently portray themselves as neutral distributors of news, using taglines such as "unbiased coverage" or "trustworthy and confirmed details" to mislead their followers. This intentional trickery lets pro-Kremlin stories penetrate discussions among the Polish population, manufacturing a false perception for a huge number of followers.

The Mechanics of Deception

The collection of twenty-two outlets operates like an orchestrated system for disinformation. They market themselves as genuine providers of Polish information and news, with a couple stating they are impartial and another vowing to deliver "unbiased" coverage. A particular channel even claims to provide "trustworthy and confirmed details concealed from the general population." In truth, they deliver a nonstop flow of material that references or copies content originating from state-controlled Russian media such as Sputnik and RT. These entities have been prohibited by the European Union because they manipulate information and circulate propaganda. As a member of the EU, Poland is a key focus of these strategies.

These outlets methodically boost the voices of important people inside the Russian government. They regularly reference or provide links to Vladimir Putin, the president, and Dmitry Medvedev, who serves as the deputy chief of the national security council. Maria Zakharova, a spokeswoman for the foreign ministry, is also often featured. Vladimir Solovyov, a television personality, and pro-war military analysts, who are called "Z-bloggers," appear conspicuously as well. This approach guarantees that a steady stream of Kremlin-endorsed content gets to Polish viewers, circumventing established media filters.

Fabricating Reality and Denying Atrocities

The propaganda shared through these Polish-language Telegram outlets often contains blatant lies intended to reshape history. For instance, the outlet UKR LEAKS_pl distributed a picture that depicted individuals in army-style clothing putting artificial blood onto others. The text with it, "how the 'Bucha victims' were prepared," suggests the murder of numerous Ukrainian non-combatants by the Russian military during 2022 was fabricated. This bold rejection of verified war crimes is intended to clear Russia of blame and sow confusion.

Another frequent strategy is to call Ukrainian officials and military personnel "Nazis." The channel InfoDefensePOLAND described the Kyiv administration as a "Nazi administration," incorrectly stating it acts as a surrogate "governed by the United States" and other Western nations. By blending true details with falsehoods, or leaving out important background, these outlets generate a deceptive narrative. When Russia conducted a lethal assault against residential structures in Kyiv which occurred on June 17, more than half of these operations did not mention it, choosing to feature reports on the Russian army’s gains. A few others repeated Kremlin talking points, assigning responsibility to Ukraine for the deaths.

A Coordinated Digital Offensive

A review of Telegram metadata points to a calculated and organised plan supporting this network. A large number of the 22 operations started up close to the time of Russia’s large-scale military action in Ukraine in February 2022, suggesting a deliberate information strategy. No fewer than three of these outlets first published materials in the Russian language before they were restyled as Polish operations. This points to a specific change in focus to directly influence the Polish people.

The metadata also indicates these channels function in a closed loop. They consistently reference, re-post, and cite each other, which builds an echo chamber that strengthens their messaging. Throughout 2022 and 2023, they circulated lists called "good Polish Telegram sources" and strongly encouraged their audience to sign up for associated channels. This reciprocal promotion boosts their visibility and gives the impression of a wider agreement, making their propaganda seem more believable to naive readers.

Poland: A Crucial Ally Under Siege

Poland’s standing as a vital supporter of Ukraine makes it a major focus for Russian disinformation. Since the 2022 military action, Poland has led the way in giving military assistance and supplies to its neighbour. The nation has also turned into a vital logistical centre for Western weapon shipments. Warsaw's firm defence of Kyiv's position inside NATO and the European Union has cemented its status as a leading and vital defence ally. This firm backing, however, has put Poland squarely in the path of Russian hybrid warfare methods.

Beyond its military and diplomatic assistance, Poland received almost a million people fleeing Ukraine, showing incredible unity during the crisis. This humanitarian work, though applauded around the world, has also become a central theme for Russian influence campaigns. By fanning anxieties and ill-will, these efforts try to weaken the social unity that has been essential to Poland’s reaction. The objective is unmistakable: to destabilise Poland internally and break apart the global coalition that backs Ukraine.

The Telegram Launchpad

Telegram acts as an important springboard for disinformation to circulate in Poland. Untrue or deceptive material frequently shows up on the service first. It is then boosted within extremist circles and moves to bigger services like Facebook and X (previously Twitter). This causes a cascading effect, letting marginal views enter mainstream digital conversations and affect a much larger viewership. The service’s lenient content rules make it a perfect environment for these kinds of operations.

The material distributed by these channels is crafted to take advantage of social tensions. The main objective is to reduce Polish backing for Ukraine, create rifts in public sentiment, and create a fissure between the two populations. This method seems to be working. Current polling indicates a rise in weariness among Poles concerning refugees, a change that is attributed partly to the constant anti-Ukrainian propaganda online.

Image Credit - BBC

Sowing Seeds of Doubt and Division

The content shared by these pro-Russian outlets is not always openly hostile. While some material is clearly pro-Kremlin or against Ukraine, other posts use more clever methods to sway public thought. For example, recent content has claimed that higher military budgets in nations of the EU, intended to oppose what they see as a Russian danger, are the very thing making people, including Poles, poor. This story skillfully exploits financial worries, recasting essential defence spending as a hardship for regular citizens.

Another recurring topic is the use of baseless stereotypes regarding Ukrainian refugees. These stories depict them as violent, disrespectful of the law, and a burden on the finances of the nations that host them. This type of content successfully preys on genuine anxieties by linking the refugee problem to existing financial and social worries in Polish society. By leveraging these weak points, the propaganda works to shift public feeling against both the refugees and the government’s policies that aid them.

Exploiting History and Far-Right Narratives

A deep-seated historical animosity toward Russia exists in Poland, a country that was under the Soviet Union's control for many years, which means that plainly pro-Russian content often doesn't succeed. Because of this, pro-Kremlin agents change their approach. They frequently combine pro-Kremlin messaging with material from the far-right and with conspiracy theories. This blend of ideas resonates well with particular groups.

Telegram is a perfect vehicle for this kind of mixed propaganda. The application holds significant sway with far-right organisations and conspiracy followers, who are more open to ideas that question established media and institutions. By meshing their objectives with these existing beliefs, Russian influence campaigns can effectively disguise their main points, making them more acceptable to a Polish readership that would normally be very wary of anything coming from Moscow.

Unmasking the Puppeteers

Although the people running most of these channels are not known, there are definite connections to Russia and its partner, Belarus. The posting patterns of numerous channels indicate they work on a rotation that matches the business day in Moscow. This points to a professional, organised campaign, not a spontaneous movement. The data suggests a state-backed effort intended to sway the opinions of the Polish public.

Certain networks are linked to well-known pro-Kremlin personalities. The UKR LEAKS_pl operation is one piece of a bigger, multilingual campaign managed by Vasily Prozorov, who once served as an officer in the Ukrainian security service before defecting to Russia. The InfoDefense group is connected to InfoDefensePOLAND and to Yury Podolyaka, a pro-Kremlin blogger from Ukraine who is now in Russia and was convicted in absentia for his work with Moscow. Another operation, Pravda PL, is a component of a large global system of pro-Kremlin websites and is tied to a Russian technology company in occupied Crimea.

The Web of Disinformation Networks

The campaigns that run these channels are large and highly structured. Vasily Prozorov’s UKR LEAKS is a network of Telegram channels and associated sites available in many languages. Prozorov, a former officer in the Ukrainian security service (SBU), has acknowledged working with Russian intelligence since 2014. His network puts out unfounded "reports" designed to harm Ukraine's reputation, including one that wrongly stated the US was using Ukraine for "bio testing." This network widely distributes anti-Ukrainian material on various services, such as a special website and profiles on Rumble, Odysee, and Twitter.

Likewise, the InfoDefense organisation, associated with Yury Podolyaka, is active in more than 30 languages. It operates as a community of volunteers who translate and share Russian propaganda. Podolyaka is a divisive blogger who relocated to Russian-occupied Crimea in 2014 and has seen his social media presence grow massively since the full-scale military action began. The InfoDefense organisation says it has a worldwide team of over 500 volunteers who back Russia. The Pravda network, another significant entity, has repurposed material from sanctioned Russian news sources and has contaminated the output of AI chatbots with its falsehoods.

Channel Defences and Denials

When faced with claims of distributing pro-Kremlin propaganda, a few channels have tried to justify their actions. The channel that posted the altered video of American effigies being set on fire, Polska Grupa Informacyjna, maintained it was an "independent news source." It asserted that its "main guiding value is impartiality" and firmly denied any insinuation that it pushed pro-Kremlin messaging.

The channel’s spokespeople contended that such material might be posted "as an illustration of divisive content found on the internet, without endorsement or review by the editorial team." They also said that content could be changed or deleted if it were found to be false. This explanation, however, fails to address the steady practice of posting material that serves Russian state objectives and the regular promotion of other outlets within the pro-Kremlin network.

Image Credit - BBC

The Threat to Public Discourse

The growth of these disinformation outlets presents a major danger to the soundness of the media environment in Poland. Telegram permits forbidden Russian state-run media like RT and Sputnik to have a continued presence and connect with a large viewership. The material from these outlets is very often untrue, altered, or completely made up. The continuous introduction of this type of content into public conversation risks making Russian state-approved stories seem normal.

The ongoing anti-Ukrainian articles help to validate and solidify the viewpoints and stories of the Russian government in Polish public conversations. This wearing away of a fact-based agreement could have severe effects, not just on Polish-Ukrainian relations, but also on the soundness of Poland’s own democratic system. By fostering a tainted information space, these campaigns make it harder for the public to arrive at well-reasoned conclusions and simpler for foreign opponents to meet their own strategic aims.

Waning Support for Refugees

The unceasing propaganda effort seems to be a factor in a clear change in Polish public sentiment. At first, Poland greeted Ukrainian refugees with a massive show of assistance. But, recent studies show an increasing "refugee fatigue." Public backing for aiding Ukrainians dropped from 94% when the full-scale military action started to 57% by December 2024. A poll in 2024 showed that 51% of Poles now think the amount of help is excessive.

This evolving attitude is being used by political figures. Right-wing political groups have begun to employ anti-Ukrainian language in their platforms, holding refugees responsible for problems like crowded schools and high housing costs. Even moderate politicians have changed their stances, with the mayor of Warsaw suggesting limits on child support for refugees who are not employed. This change in politics demonstrates how disinformation has successfully changed a humanitarian problem into a contentious political issue.

Economic Realities vs. False Narratives

Even though propaganda depicts Ukrainian refugees as a burden on the national finances, the facts indicate the reverse. Ukrainian refugees contributed a net gain of 2.7% to Poland’s GDP in 2024. The quick opening of the job market has enabled refugees to become part of the economy, with job rates climbing steeply. They add to the economy as workers, business owners, and shoppers, increasing both demand and output. This financial input directly challenges the untrue stories promoted on services like Telegram.

The disinformation efforts purposefully overlook these statistics. They concentrate instead on whipping up worries about Polish tax money going to refugees. This story of a financial strain is effective because it connects with real concerns about living costs. By making a false association between financial troubles and the refugee presence, the propaganda intends to build resentment and weaken the solidarity that has defined Poland’s reaction to the crisis.

Countering the Disinformation Onslaught

Poland and its partners are taking action. The Polish government has been more outspoken about the danger, with authorities describing Russia's attempts to meddle in elections and weaken the nation as "unprecedented." Warsaw has reacted to a Russian program of sabotage, which involved setting fire to a shopping centre in Warsaw, by shutting down Russia's consulate in Krakow. The United States and Poland in June 2024 established the Ukraine Communications Group in Warsaw, a cooperative project with 12 nations to find and expose Russian disinformation.

On the home front, Poland has set up a special body to look into Russian and Belarusian meddling between 2004 and 2024. The Ministry of Digitalization also started an "Electoral Umbrella" project in early 2025 to watch for altered content and improve digital security before elections. These actions show a rising understanding that fighting information warfare demands a complex strategy that includes diplomatic moves, intelligence gathering, and public education efforts to strengthen society against outside manipulation.